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Secular Administration of Religious Institutions and the Constitutional Boundary between Faith and Governance
Introduction
The Indian Constitution guarantees freedom of religion under Articles 25 and 26 while simultaneously empowering the State to regulate secular activities associated with religious practice under Article 25(2)(a). Over seven decades, the Supreme Court and High Courts have repeatedly drawn a careful line between what is essential to religion (and therefore protected) and what is secular administration of temples, endowments and offerings (and therefore regulable).
This article synthesises the consistent legal principles emerging from the landmark decisions in The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt (1954), Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj v. State of Rajasthan (1963), Pannalal Bansilal Pitti v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1996), Bhuri Nath v. State of J&K (1997), the Orissa Jagannath Temple case (1997), the Kashi Vishwanath Temple Act challenge, the recent Madhya Pradesh High Court judgment in the Bhojshala–Kamal Maula Mosque matter (2026), and the observations of Justice Abhay S. Oka on secular functioning of courts (2024).
Together, these authorities establish a coherent and enduring constitutional doctrine.
1. The Foundational Distinction: Essential Religious Practice vs Secular Administration
The starting point remains the Constitution Bench decision in Shirur Mutt (AIR 1954 SC 282). The Court held that:
• Religion is not confined to doctrine; it includes rituals, ceremonies and modes of worship that form an integral part of the faith.
• What constitutes an essential religious practice must be determined with reference to the doctrines and practices of that religion itself.
• Administration of the property of a religious institution, however, is a secular activity and is subject to State regulation.
This distinction has been consistently reaffirmed. In Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj (AIR 1963 SC 1638), the Court held that the Nathdwara Temple is a public temple and that the right to manage its properties is a purely secular matter. The Legislature is competent to regulate the administration of properties of public religious institutions without violating Articles 25 or 26.
The same principle was applied in Pannalal Bansilal Pitti (AIR 1996 SC 1023), where the Court upheld the abolition of hereditary trusteeship under the Andhra Pradesh Act of 1987. Hereditary right to trusteeship was held not to be an essential or integral part of Hindu religion. The Court observed that while the right to establish a religious institution is part of religious freedom, the right to administer it cannot be claimed as an absolute religious right immune from regulation.
2. Abolition of Traditional Rights in Offerings and Hereditary Privileges
Several decisions have clarified that rights to collect or share in offerings are generally secular in character and may be abolished for better administration and public interest.
In Bhuri Nath v. State of J&K (AIR 1997 SC 1711), the Court upheld the Jammu & Kashmir Shri Mata Vaishno Devi Shrine Act, 1988, which extinguished the traditional rights of Baridars. The Court held that:
• Collection and distribution of offerings is a secular activity.
• The right of Baridars is not a religious right protected under Articles 25 or 26.
• The Board constituted under the Act is not a “controlled corporation” under Article 12, and the Governor acts in his official capacity as Governor.
A parallel approach is visible in the Orissa Jagannath Temple cases and the challenge to the Kashi Vishwanath Temple Act, where installation of Hundis and denial of traditional shares to Sevaks were held valid. The offerings belong to the deity; the right of attendants is only a form of remuneration for secular duties.
In Pannalal, the Court similarly upheld the abolition of the right to receive shares in offerings (Section 144 of the A.P. Act), while reading down the provisions to ensure that the founder or a member of the founder’s family is given the position of Chairman of the Board of Trustees — thereby balancing regulation with continuity of traditional interest.
3. Public Character of Temples and State’s Regulatory Power
Where a temple is held to be a public temple, the scope of State regulation is wider. In Tilkayat, the historical Firmans and the nature of the institution led the Court to conclude that Nathdwara is a public temple. The Tilkayat is only a Custodian, Manager and Trustee; he has no proprietary interest that can claim immunity from legislation.
This public-character doctrine continues to influence modern adjudication. The Madhya Pradesh High Court in the Bhojshala case (2026:MPHC-IND:8805) applied similar reasoning when it examined the religious character of the disputed structure on the basis of archaeological, historical and scientific evidence rather than on claims of continuous possession alone.
4. Determination of Religious Character through Evidence
The Bhojshala judgment (15 May 2026) marks an important contemporary application of these principles. Relying on a court-ordered multi-disciplinary ASI survey, historical literature, inscriptions, and architectural features, the High Court held that:
• The disputed area is a protected monument since 1904.
• Its religious character is that of Bhojshala with a temple of Goddess Vagdevi (Saraswati).
• The ASI order of 7 April 2003 restricting Hindu worship and permitting Friday namaz was quashed to the extent it interfered with the established character.
• ASI retains overall supervisory control over preservation and regulation of religious access.
The Court emphasised that archaeological evidence is admissible and can form the basis of judicial conclusions, drawing upon the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the Ayodhya judgment. Faith alone cannot override scientific and historical evidence when the character of a protected monument is in issue.
5. Secularism in the Functioning of Courts
The principle of secularism is not confined to temple administration. In March 2024, Justice Abhay S. Oka observed that religious rituals such as pooja, archana or lighting of lamps should not be performed in court premises during official judicial events. He suggested that such events should begin by bowing before a copy of the Preamble of the Constitution, emphasising the words “Secular” and “Democracy”.
These observations, though not a binding judicial order, reinforce the constitutional expectation that the judiciary itself must remain visibly neutral and secular in its functioning.
Synthesis of Core Legal Principles
From the above body of jurisprudence, the following settled principles emerge:
- Essential religious practices are protected under Articles 25 and 26; they are determined by the doctrines of the religion itself.
- Administration, management and control of temple properties and offerings are secular activities and are subject to State regulation under Article 25(2)(a).
- Hereditary rights of trusteeship or shares in offerings are generally not essential religious practices and may be abolished by legislation for better administration and public welfare.
- Public temples are more amenable to regulatory legislation than private temples.
- Religious character of disputed structures, especially protected monuments, can be determined on the basis of archaeological, historical and scientific evidence.
- Secularism requires that State institutions, including courts, maintain institutional neutrality and avoid identification with any particular religion in official functions.
Conclusion
The consistent thread running through Shirur Mutt (1954), Tilkayat (1963), Pannalal (1996), Bhuri Nath (1997), the Jagannath and Kashi Vishwanath cases, the Bhojshala judgment (2026), and the observations of Justice Oka is the careful constitutional calibration between religious freedom and the State’s power to regulate the secular dimensions of religious institutions.
The courts have repeatedly affirmed that while the inner core of faith remains inviolable, the outer framework of administration, property management, and public access can — and often must — be regulated in the larger interest of order, transparency and the welfare of devotees. This jurisprudence continues to provide a stable and principled framework for resolving conflicts between tradition, regulation and the constitutional commitment to secularism.
Landmark Judgments on Temple Administration,
Religious Freedom & Secular Governance
This compilation presents structured case briefs of the most significant judgments concerning the constitutional boundary between religious freedom (Articles 25 & 26) and the State’s power to regulate the secular administration of temples and religious institutions. Arranged chronologically from the foundational Shirur Mutt decision of 1954 to the 2026 Bhojshala judgment, these briefs retain the complete eight-part structure for professional study and reference.
The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras vs Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt
The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras vs Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt
AIR 1954 SC 282; (1954) SCR 1005
Date of Judgment: 16 April 1954
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: B.K. Mukherjea, J. (Constitution Bench)
This is the foundational judgment on the interpretation of Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution in the context of Hindu religious institutions. It examined the validity of several provisions of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951.
The Mathadhipati of the ancient Shirur Mutt challenged the action of the State authorities in attempting to frame a scheme for the administration of the Math under the 1951 Act. He contended that the Act interfered with his fundamental rights as Mathadhipati and with the rights of the religious denomination.
The Madras High Court issued a writ of prohibition against the framing of the scheme and struck down several sections of the Act. The Commissioner appealed to the Supreme Court.
- What is the true scope of Articles 25 and 26?
- Whether the Mathadhipati has a proprietary interest protected under Article 19(1)(f).
- Whether the contribution levied under Section 76 is a tax or a fee.
The Court laid down the classic principles: Religion is not confined to doctrine; it includes rituals, ceremonies and modes of worship which are integral to the religion. What is an essential part of religion is to be determined with reference to the doctrines and practices of that religion. Administration of property of a religious institution is a secular matter and can be regulated by the State. The rights of a Mathadhipati are a blend of office and property and are protected under Article 19(1)(f). The annual contribution under Section 76 is a tax and not a fee, and was therefore beyond the legislative competence of the State.
Sections 21, 30(2), 31, 55, 56, 63 to 69 and 76 of the Madras Act, 1951 were declared ultra vires. The core principles governing Articles 25 and 26 were authoritatively laid down.
The appeal was partly allowed. The writ of prohibition issued by the High Court on the merits was maintained. Several provisions of the Act were struck down.
Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj vs The State of Rajasthan & Ors.
Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj vs The State of Rajasthan & Ors.
AIR 1963 SC 1638; (1964) 1 SCR 561
Date of Judgment: 21 January 1963
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: P.B. Gajendragadkar, J. (Constitution Bench)
This is a landmark case concerning the famous Nathdwara Temple (Shrinathji Temple) of the Vallabh denomination. The validity of the Nathdwara Temple Act, 1959 was challenged by the Tilkayat (the hereditary head) and the denomination.
The Tilkayat claimed that the temple and its properties were his private property. Alternatively, he claimed beneficial interest as Shebait/Mahant. The denomination claimed rights under Article 26. The State of Rajasthan enacted the 1959 Act transferring management to a statutory Board.
Three writ petitions were filed in the Rajasthan High Court. The High Court largely upheld the Act but struck down certain provisions. Cross-appeals were filed in the Supreme Court.
- Whether the Nathdwara Temple is a private temple or a public temple.
- Whether the Act violates Articles 25, 26, 19(1)(f) and 31 of the Constitution.
On the basis of historical Firmans (especially the 1934 Firman of the Maharana of Udaipur), the Court held that the temple is a public temple. The Tilkayat is only a Custodian, Manager and Trustee of the properties belonging to the deity. The right to manage the properties of a temple is a purely secular matter and is not protected under Articles 25 or 26. The Legislature is competent to regulate the administration of the properties of a public religious institution.
Nathdwara Temple is a public temple. The Tilkayat has no proprietary right in the temple properties. The major provisions of the Act are valid. Certain minor provisions (parts of Sections 16, 28, 30(2)(a), 36 and 37) were struck down as ultra vires.
The appeals were partly allowed. The substantial portion of the Nathdwara Temple Act, 1959 was upheld.
Pannalal Bansilal Pitti & Ors. vs State of Andhra Pradesh
Pannalal Bansilal Pitti & Ors. vs State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr.
AIR 1996 SC 1023; (1996) 2 SCC 498; JT 1996 (1) 516
Date of Judgment: 17 January 1996
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: K. Ramaswamy & B.L. Hansaria, JJ.
Challenge to the constitutional validity of Sections 15, 16, 17, 29(5) and 144 of the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987, which abolished hereditary trusteeship and the right of trustees/archakas to receive shares/emoluments from offerings.
Hereditary trustees of several Hindu temples and charitable institutions in Andhra Pradesh challenged the above provisions. The Act abolished the hereditary right to trusteeship and the traditional right to receive a share in the offerings (hundi, rusums, plate collections, etc.).
Writ petitions under Article 32 and transferred cases from the High Court were heard together by the Supreme Court.
- Whether abolition of hereditary trusteeship violates Articles 25 and 26.
- Whether abolition of shares in offerings is unconstitutional.
- Whether the Act is discriminatory as it applies only to Hindu institutions.
Administration and management of religious institutions are secular activities. Hereditary right to trusteeship is not an essential or integral part of Hindu religion. The State has power under Article 25(2)(a) to regulate secular activities. The Court, however, read down Sections 17 and 29(5). While upholding the abolition of pure hereditary trusteeship, it held that the founder or a member of the founder’s family should be appointed as Chairman of the Board of Trustees so that the founder’s family retains a meaningful role in management. This would encourage philanthropy and better serve the objects of the endowment.
Sections 15, 16, 17, 29(5) and 144 of the A.P. Act, 1987 are constitutionally valid. Abolition of hereditary trusteeship and the right to receive shares in offerings is valid. Rider: Under Sections 17 and 29(5), the founder or a member of the founder’s family shall be made Chairman of the Board of Trustees. The Act does not violate Articles 14, 25 or 26.
All the writ petitions and transfer cases were disposed of in the above terms. No order as to costs.
Bhuri Nath & Ors. vs State of Jammu & Kashmir & Ors.
Bhuri Nath & Ors. vs State of J&K & Ors.
AIR 1997 SC 1711; (1997) 2 SCC 745; JT 1997 (1) SC 546
Date of Judgment: 10 January 1997
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: K. Ramaswamy, J. (speaking for the Court)
This case examined the constitutional validity of the Jammu and Kashmir Shri Mata Vaishno Devi Shrine Act, 1988. The Act abolished the traditional rights of “Baridars” (persons who collected and shared offerings) and transferred the management of the famous Mata Vaishno Devi Shrine to a statutory Board headed by the Governor of the State.
The Mata Vaishno Devi Shrine in Jammu is one of the most important Hindu pilgrimage centres. Traditionally, Baridars (hereditary functionaries) had the right to receive a share of the offerings made by pilgrims. Over time, serious mismanagement and exploitation of pilgrims were reported. The State Legislature enacted the 1988 Act which: Vested the ownership of the Shrine Fund in a Board of Trustees; Made the Governor the ex-officio Chairman of the Board; Completely extinguished the rights of all Baridars from the date of commencement of the Act; Provided for a Tribunal to recommend compensation to Baridars.
The Baridars challenged the Act before the High Court. After the High Court upheld the Act, they approached the Supreme Court by special leave.
- Whether the Shrine Board is a “controlled corporation” of the State.
- Whether the Governor exercises powers under the Act as the executive head of the State or in his official capacity as Governor.
- Whether abolition of Baridars’ rights without adequate compensation violates the right to property.
The Court carefully examined the scheme of the Act. It held that the Governor acts under the Act in his official capacity as Governor, and not as the executive head of the State with the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. The Board is therefore not a State-controlled corporation. The management of the Shrine, including the collection and distribution of offerings, is a secular activity. The right of Baridars to receive offerings is not a religious right protected under Articles 25 or 26. The Legislature is competent to abolish such rights for better administration of the Shrine and for the welfare of pilgrims. Compensation is payable as provided under the Act.
The Board is not a controlled corporation of the State. The Act is constitutionally valid. Rights of Baridars stand extinguished. Baridars are entitled only to compensation determined in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the guidelines framed by the Governor.
The appeals were disposed of in terms of the above findings. Directions were issued for determination of compensation by the Tribunal.
Sri Adi Visheshwara of Kashi Vishwanath Temple vs State of U.P.
Sri Adi Visheshwara of Kashi Vishwanath Temple, Varanasi & Ors. vs State of U.P. & Ors.
(1997) 2 SCR 1086; AIR 1997 SC 827
Date of Judgment: 14 March 1997
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: K. Ramaswamy, K. Venkataswami and G.B. Pattanaik, JJ.
These appeals challenged the constitutional validity of the Uttar Pradesh Sri Kashi Vishwanath Temple Act, 1983. The Act took over the management and administration of the renowned Sri Kashi Vishwanath Temple at Varanasi from the traditional Mahants and Pandas and vested it in a statutory Board of Trustees.
Sri Kashi Vishwanath Temple at Varanasi is one of the most sacred Jyotirlingas. The management had fallen into an appalling condition. On the basis of a Committee’s recommendation, the State of U.P. enacted the 1983 Act vesting ownership in the deity and entrusting management to a Board of Trustees. The appellants challenged the Act as violative of Articles 25(1) and 26(b) & (d).
The Allahabad High Court upheld the validity of the Act on 28 October 1986. The appellants preferred appeals by special leave to the Supreme Court.
- Whether Sri Kashi Vishwanath Temple is a denominational temple of Shaivites entitled to protection under Article 26.
- Whether the Act interferes with the religious rights of the appellants under Articles 25 and 26.
- Whether the Act is constitutionally valid.
The Act carefully distinguishes between religious functions and secular management. Religious rituals are left to the Archakas/Priests. Secular management is entrusted to the Board. Ownership vests in the deity. The Temple is a public temple open to all Hindus. Believers of Shaiva form of worship are not a separate religious denomination. Administration and management of a temple are secular activities and can be regulated by the State.
Sri Kashi Vishwanath Temple is not a denominational temple. The U.P. Sri Kashi Vishwanath Temple Act, 1983 does not violate Articles 25 and 26. The Act is constitutionally valid.
The appeals are dismissed. No order as to costs. The interim direction allowing the appellants to perform pooja as ordinary devotees is made absolute.
State of Orissa & Sri Jagannath Temple Puri Management Committee vs Chintamani Khuntia & Ors.
State of Orissa and Sri Jagannath Temple Puri Management Committee vs Chintamani Khuntia & Ors.
AIR 1997 SC 3839; (1997) 8 SCC 422
Date of Judgment: 17 September 1997
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Suhas C. Sen, J.
This appeal raises an important constitutional question regarding the nature of the right claimed by the temple attendants (Sevaks) of the famous Jagannath Temple at Puri to receive a share in the offerings (Veta and Pindika) made by devotees, and whether the installation of Hundis and denial of share under the amended Shri Jagannath Temple Act, 1954 is constitutionally valid.
Traditionally, Sevaks collected offerings known as Veta and Pindika and were entitled to a share. Due to mismanagement, the State amended the 1954 Act inserting Sections 28-B and 28-C empowering installation of Hundis and providing that no Sevak shall get any share from the offerings placed in the Hundis.
The Orissa High Court struck down the amended provisions. The State of Orissa and the Temple Management Committee appealed to the Supreme Court.
- Whether the right of the Sevaks to a share of the offerings is a religious right protected under Articles 25 and 26.
- Whether installation of Hundis and denial of share violates religious freedom or property rights.
- Whether Sections 28-B and 28-C are constitutionally valid.
The Court held that the religious practice ends when the devotee makes the offering. Subsequent collection and distribution are purely secular activities. The right of Sevaks is only a form of remuneration for secular duties. Management of a temple is a secular activity. Offerings belong to the deity. Installation of Hundis does not interfere with traditional worship.
Collection and distribution of offerings is a secular activity. The right of Sevaks is not a religious right under Articles 25 or 26. Installation of Hundis and denial of share does not violate Articles 25, 26 or 300-A. Sections 28-B and 28-C(9) are constitutionally valid.
The appeals are allowed. The judgment of the Orissa High Court is set aside. Sections 28-B and 28-C(9) are held valid. No order as to costs.
M.P. Gopalakrishnan Nair & Anr. vs State of Kerala & Ors.
M.P. Gopalakrishnan Nair & Anr. vs State of Kerala & Ors.
(2005) 11 SCC 45; AIR 2005 SC 3053
Date of Judgment: 20 April 2005
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: H.K. Sema, J. and S.B. Sinha, J.
Challenge to the power of Hindu Ministers in the Kerala Council of Ministers (including those belonging to the Left Democratic Front) to nominate members to the Managing Committee of the famous Guruvayoor Sri Krishna Temple under the Guruvayoor Devaswom Act, 1978.
Under Section 4 of the 1978 Act, certain members of the Managing Committee are to be nominated by the Hindus among the Council of Ministers. The appellants contended that Ministers belonging to Marxist ideology could not validly nominate members because they allegedly did not believe in God or temple worship.
A five-Judge Bench of the Kerala High Court dismissed the writ petition. The present civil appeals were filed before the Supreme Court.
- Whether the expression “Hindu” must be restricted to persons who believe in temple worship.
- Whether Hindu Ministers must themselves personally believe in temple worship to validly nominate members.
- Whether Section 4 violates Articles 25 and 26.
Administration of a temple is a secular activity. Religious and spiritual matters are exclusively left to the Thanthri. The word “Hindu” is comprehensive and is not restricted only to temple-worshippers. Nominees must satisfy the statutory qualifications (belief in temple worship and oath). It is not necessary that the nominating Ministers themselves must be temple-worshippers.
The word “Hindu” is not restricted only to temple-worshippers. Hindu Ministers are competent to nominate members. Section 4 of the 1978 Act does not violate Articles 25 or 26. Management of a temple is a secular activity which the State can regulate.
The appeals are dismissed. No order as to costs.
The Chairman, Tamil Nadu Uniformed Services Recruitment Board vs M. Madhan Kumar
The Chairman, Tamil Nadu Uniformed Services Recruitment Board vs M. Madhan Kumar
W.A. No. 670 of 2020
Date of Judgment: 31 August 2020
Court: Madras High Court
Bench: A.P. Sahi, Chief Justice and Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy, J.
This Writ Appeal examined the scope of judicial interference in matters of key answers in competitive examinations, the binding nature of the prescribed time-limit for raising objections, and the effect of any alleged concession by counsel.
The respondent secured 62.30 marks against a cut-off of 63.30 for the post of Sub-Inspector of Police (Finger Print). He claimed one grace mark on the ground of a translational error in a question, but had not raised objection within the prescribed seven days and had himself marked a wrong option.
The Single Judge allowed the writ petition and directed award of one mark. The Recruitment Board filed the present Writ Appeal.
- Whether a candidate who failed to raise objection within the prescribed time can later claim benefit of a wrong key answer.
- Whether the High Court can re-evaluate key answers.
- Whether any concession by counsel can create a right contrary to the advertisement terms.
Relying on Supreme Court precedents, the Court held that courts should not re-evaluate answer sheets or sit as experts. Key answers are to be presumed correct. A wrong concession on a pure question of law does not bind the State. Any deviation from the terms of the advertisement would violate Articles 14 and 16.
A candidate who does not raise objection within the prescribed time cannot later claim benefit. The High Court cannot re-evaluate key answers. Any suggestion or concession by counsel cannot create a right contrary to the advertisement terms and settled law.
The Writ Appeal is allowed. The judgment of the Single Judge is set aside. The writ petition stands dismissed. No order as to costs.
Observations of Justice Abhay S. Oka on Secular Functioning of Courts
This is not a court judgment. It is a news report of oral observations made by Hon’ble Justice Abhay S. Oka of the Supreme Court of India while speaking at a foundation-laying ceremony of a new court building in Pimpri-Chinchwad, Pune.
- Justice Oka urged the legal fraternity to avoid performing religious rituals (such as pooja) inside court premises during official events.
- He suggested that events should be inaugurated by bowing before a copy of the Preamble of the Constitution instead of performing religious ceremonies.
- He emphasised the importance of the words “Secular” and “Democracy” in the Preamble.
- He stated that the core of the judicial system is the Constitution, and the judiciary must remain secular in its functioning and appearance.
These observations reflect the principle of secularism that courts should not be associated with any particular religion in their official functions. It is only a public statement, not a binding judicial order.
Hindu Front for Justice vs Union of India (Bhojshala – Kamal Maula Mosque Case)
Hindu Front for Justice (Regd. Trust No. 976) through its President Ms. Ranjana Agnihotri & Ors. vs Union of India & Ors.
(Along with WP Nos. 10484/2022, 8986/2026, 28334/2019, 6514/2013 and WA No. 559/2026)
Neutral Citation: 2026:MPHC-IND:8805
Date of Judgment: 15 May 2026
Court: High Court of Madhya Pradesh (Indore Bench)
Bench: Justice Vijay Kumar Shukla & Justice Alok Awasthi
Batch of writ petitions concerning the disputed Bhojshala–Kamal Maula Mosque complex at Dhar (Khasra No. 604, old No. 313). Hindu petitioners claimed exclusive right to worship Goddess Vagdevi/Saraswati and challenged the ASI order dated 07.04.2003 that permitted Friday namaz and restricted Hindu worship to Tuesdays and Basant Panchami.
Petitioners claimed the structure was originally a temple of Goddess Saraswati (Vagdevi) and a centre of Sanskrit learning (Bhojshala) established by Raja Bhoj in 1034 A.D. The idol was taken to the British Museum in 1903. The ASI order of 07.04.2003 allowed Muslims Friday namaz and restricted Hindu access. Hindu side sought daily unrestricted pooja and re-installation of the idol. Muslim parties claimed the structure is the Kamal Maula Mosque.
Multiple writ petitions and one writ appeal filed over the years were clubbed and heard together by the Division Bench.
- Whether the disputed area is a Hindu temple of Goddess Saraswati or a mosque.
- Whether Hindus have exclusive fundamental right under Article 25 to perform pooja.
- Whether the ASI order dated 07.04.2003 is legal and constitutional.
- Whether the Court can direct re-installation of the idol and creation of a Trust.
The Court examined historical literature, architectural features, inscriptions, earlier excavations (1972-73), and a detailed multi-disciplinary scientific survey ordered by the Court (ASI report in 10 volumes). Key findings: The structure was originally a Bhojshala and temple of Goddess Vagdevi of the Paramara period. The present structure was built over a pre-existing temple structure which was later modified and reused as a mosque. 94 sculptures/fragments of Hindu deities, 106 pillars of temple style, and more than 150 Sanskrit/Prakrit inscriptions were found. The 1935 Ailan was held to be only an executive order and invalid. No evidence of valid Waqf was found. Continuity of Hindu worship was never extinguished.
The disputed area is a protected monument under the 1958 Act with effect from 18.03.1904. Its religious character is that of Bhojshala with a temple of Goddess Vagdevi (Saraswati). The ASI order dated 07.04.2003 (to the extent it restricted Hindu worship and permitted Friday namaz) is quashed. ASI shall continue overall administration and management and shall have full supervisory control over preservation, conservation and regulation of religious access. Government of India may consider representations for bringing back the Pratima of Goddess Saraswati from the London Museum. If the Muslim community applies for allotment of suitable alternative land in Dhar district for a mosque, the State Government may consider the application in accordance with law.
WP No. 10497/2022 (Hindu Front for Justice) and WP No. 10484/2022 (Kuldeep Tiwari) — Allowed with the above directions.
WP No. 8986/2026 (Salek Chand Jain) — Dismissed.
WP No. 28334/2019 (Maulana Kamaluddin Welfare Society) and WA No. 559/2026 (Qazi Zakullah) — Dismissed.
WP No. 6514/2013 (Antar Singh) — Disposed of without deciding on merits.
No order as to costs.
Important Note
The Chairman, Tamil Nadu Uniformed Services Recruitment Board vs M. Madhan Kumar
W.A. No. 670 of 2020 | 31 August 2020 | Madras High Court
This judgment is included only for chronological completeness. It deals solely with competitive examination procedures and recruitment rules, and has no connection with the constitutional principles of religious freedom or secular administration of religious institutions.
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